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From Bits to Atoms: Does the Open Source Software Model 
Translate to Open Source Hardware? 
By Dana Beldiman* 
Many believe that open source innovation works “faster, better 
and cheaper” than conventional, proprietary innovation. The success 
of open source innovation has been seen primarily in open source 
software (OSS), whose output is an intangible, digital product (bits). 
This paper asks whether the success of OSS can be replicated in an 
open source hardware (OSH) environment, which involves tangible 
products (atoms). Specifically, it considers whether the tangible 
nature of OSH products presents legal or practical obstacles to their 
successful commercial implementation, in an environment where no 
appropriable IP rights exist. To answer these questions, the paper 
follows the innovation knowledge flow generated by an OSH 
invention and examines the legal structure and enforceability of open 
hardware license. It further considers in what way the absence of IP 
rights impacts the choice of a business model for OSH. 
Review of OSS business models indicate that, despite the non-
appropriability of IP, software products are being produced through 
a wide range of models, from pure open source, to hybrid operations, 
driven by large commercial firms. Hardware presents a more difficult 
business case than software, because the output of OSH is a tangible 
product. Implementation of the invention into an end-product requires 
materials, manufacturing, labor, distribution, etc., all of which are 
cost-intensive and require capital investment. Nonetheless, a few 
OSH initiatives successfully run self-funded or non-profit-funded 
operations, even absent exclusive IP rights. However, given the costs 
associated with producing a tangible product, future business models 
are more likely to be a hybrid between open source community and a 
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commercial operator. Still, such operations would rely heavily on 
innovative input from the open source community. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Many believe that open source innovation works “faster, better 
and cheaper” than conventional, proprietary innovation. The success 
of open source innovation has been seen primarily in open source 
software (OSS), whose output is an intangible, digital product (bits). 
This paper asks whether the success of OSS can be replicated in an 
open source hardware (OSH) environment, where the output is a 
tangible product (atoms). Specifically, it considers whether the 
tangible nature of OSH products presents legal or practical obstacles 
to their successful commercial implementation. 
Open source community innovation has been extremely 
successful due to the number of contributors and the speed of 
innovation. It brings together large numbers of individuals who 
collaborate and use their minds in solving specific problems. This 
innovation process tends to occur at higher speeds and generate better 
performance than most proprietary innovation. 
During its relatively short existence, open source community 
innovation has grown from software to other information products, 
such as Wikipedia, video journalism, and open science. More recently 
it has expanded beyond pure information products into the realm of 
tangibles. “Open source hardware” (OSH) uses the same innovation 
mechanism as OSS, but its final product is a physical three-
dimensional artifact. Products of the OSH process include electronic 
devices, medical prosthetics, diagnostic equipment, musical 
equipment, power supply, lab equipment, toys and games,1 etc.  
Because of its fairly incipient state of development, OSH 
presents the researcher with a fertile petri dish of unsolved questions 
at the intersection of law, economics, business, and sociology, which 
raise cross-disciplinary issues, such as appropriability of knowledge, 
ability to capture value absent IP rights and the relation between an 
inventive open community and a commercial operator.2 
                                                          
1 LOCAL MOTORS, https://localmotors.com/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) (vehicles); OPEN SOURCE 
ECOLOGY, https://www.opensourceecology.org/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) (agricultural 
implements); ALEPH OBJECTS, INC. 3D PRINTER https://www.alephobjects.com/ (3D printers); 
ARDUINO, https://www.arduino.cc/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) (circuit boards).  
2 This article provides a “horizontal” overview over the implications of the tangible nature of the 
OSH product. The numerous legal issues surrounding OSH have been merely hinted on.  
Further in-depth “vertical” work remains to be done on these issues, to shed light on a variety of 
innovation-related topics, such as the role of knowledge in innovation, the flow of knowledge 
between inventor and implementer, managing the inventor community to generate a sustainable 
stream of innovation, the roles of IP rights and of latent community knowledge, or legal aspects 
of the OSH license enforceability, in particular relating to 3D printed products. A scholarly 
perspective on these issues may help validate the OSH industry and stimulate its development. 
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This paper is intended as an overview over the OSH process, 
highlighting legal and business aspects in an open community 
environment, specifically focusing on OSH and the tangible nature of 
its output. It is structured in three general parts. We first compare 
OSH to OSS in terms of the knowledge flow 3 enabled by the open 
innovation mechanism.  Next, we consider the legal structure of the 
open licenses and assess the enforceability of the OSH license 
compared to the OSH license. The final part discusses the tangible 
nature of the OSH product, compared to the intangible output of OSS. 
It inquires to what extent the cost associated with producing a 
tangible product, combined with the absence of appropriable IP 
rights, may detract from the commercial implementability of OSH 
inventions.  
The strength of open communities, whether OSS or OSH, lies in 
their flow of knowledge: early, repeated disclosures of knowledge, 
lead to its wide diffusion and reuse by a potentially large number of 
downstream community members and gives rise to an overall 
enhanced innovation power. However, the trade-off for this wide 
diffusion of knowledge is a reduction in the incentive to invest. This 
may make the final (commercial) implementation of the product 
problematic. We next consider the structure of the OSH license, 
whose function it is to formalize the diffusion of knowledge that 
occurs at the creative level, into an allocation of IP rights.  We note 
that the tangible nature of the OSH output prompts a slightly different 
license structure compared to the OSS license. Its enforceability 
therefore raises some questions. Finally, we compare the paths toward 
implementation of the final product. This area presents the greatest 
difference between OSH and OSS. While software is self-executing, 
the instructions for its implementation are incorporated into the code 
and running the program is all that is required, hardware must be 
built. This involves materials, manufacturing, labor, etc., all of which 
are cost-intensive and demand capital investment. In general, capital 
investment requires appropriable IP rights, however such rights are 
not available under the open source license.  
Nonetheless, in the OSH community, inventors have started 
productizing their inventions, without the benefit of outside 
investment. These initiatives appear to be successful to some extent, 
even absent exclusive IP rights, as they derive some competitive 
                                                          
3 This paper will take a “knowledge-centric” approach. The term “knowledge” has been 
borrowed from economic literature to broadly denote information resources of any type, 
including data, code, scientific formulas, test results, designs, know-how, text, etc. 
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advantage from the latent knowledge that resides within the 
community. However, because of the cost associated with production 
of a tangible good, OSH operations may only be able to scale if 
outside funding by a commercial entity is available. A hybrid model 
that combines an open community with a commercial operator would 
continue to heavily rely on the community as a source of continuing 
innovation. At the same time, a misalignment in ethos and values 
exists between the open source community and the commercial 
operator. To ensure the continued flow of innovation, the relationship 
between the two groups must be managed with skill in order not to 
destabilize the community. 
I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF OPEN SOURCE INNOVATION 
A. Background of collaborative (open source) innovation 
Collaborative innovation4, based on early cumulative disclosure 
of non-appropriated innovation, has been extensively described in 
scholarly literature.5   
The earliest and most prominent example of such innovation is 
Open Source Software (OSS).  OSS’s emergence has been enabled by 
the digitized network environment. Because of low communication 
costs, the collaboration on shared innovation projects has become 
possible among geographically dispersed individuals. They form 
communities, most often of users, for purposes of common problem-
solving projects and contribute time, knowledge and skill, generally, 
for free.6 Participants join based on a combination of intrinsic non-
monetary motivations, such as the desire to exercise creativity, the 
desire to overcome a challenge, the sense of achievement having 
solved a problem, identification with a particular group or altruism.7 
                                                          
4 Various forms of collaborative innovation are referred to as peer production, user innovation, 
open (source) innovation or co-creation, respectively. The form at issue here is characterized by 
the fact that the rights to any knowledge generated are diffused, rather than concentrated in the 
form of IP rights. It must also be differentiated from some forms of open innovation, which is 
co-created by multiple creators across firm boundaries, is intended to lead to the acquisition of 
proprietary rights. 
5 Yochai Benkler, Law, Innovation and Collaboration in Networked Economy and Society, 13 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. (2017); Kevin J. Boudreau & Karim R. Lakhani, “Open” disclosure 
of innovations, incentives and follow-on reuse: Theory on processes of cumulative innovation 
and a field experiment in computational biology, ELSEVIER, RES. POL’Y, (2015).  
6 Mark A. Lemley & Ziv Shafir, Who Chooses Open-Source Software, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 139 
(2011). 
7 Margit Osterloh, Sandra Rota & Bernhard Kuster, Open-Source-Softwareproduktion: Ein 
neues Innovationsmodell? (2004), 
http://www.opensourcejahrbuch.de/download/jb2004/chapter_02/II-4-OserlohRotaKuster.pdf; 
Karim R. Lakhani & Robert G. Wolf, Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding 
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Community members are self-selected based on their abilities 
relevant to the project; they vet, test and evaluate the quality of the 
solutions proposed by others.8  
Innovation in this context is the result of a process, in which 
knowledge generated upstream is built upon, recombined and 
cumulated to provide innovation for new products and applications, 
or for improvements of existing ones.9 Because OSS communities 
adhere to an ethos of non-appropriation, all knowledge generated is 
shared with the community.10 
The overall strength of the OSS approach lies in the number of 
contributors and the speed of innovation. Its mechanism is based on 
collaboration by a potentially vast number of contributors’ 
“eyeballs”,11 with unrestricted access to the entire body of innovation 
developed upstream relating to the project.12 This innovation process 
tends to occur at higher speeds and generate better performance than 
most proprietary innovation.13 
B. Open Hardware and its evolution 
OSH constitutes a new frontier, in which the open innovation 
mechanism moves beyond pure information products, into the realm 
of tangibles14. In recent years, technology has made considerable 
strides by developing the ability to digitally manipulate physical 
objects. A material object casts an “information shadow.”15 It can 
therefore be digitally created, represented, modified and transformed 
with the same relative ease as software goods.16 When it comes to 
                                                                                                                            
Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREE 
AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 1-27 (J. Feller et al. eds., MIT Press 2005). 
8 Benkler, supra note 5, at 236. 
9 Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 9. 
10 Richard Stallman, The GNU Manifesto (1985), https://www.gnu.org/gnu/manifesto.html. 
11 ERIC STEVEN RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN 
SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY (1999). 
12 Benkler, supra note 5, at 9; Dana Beldiman & Fabian Flüchter, Navigating Patents in an 
Open Hardware Environment, in CO-CREATION - RESHAPING BUSINESS AND SOCIETY IN THE 
ERA OF BOTTOM-UP ECONOMICS 1, 163 (M. Moritz & T. Redlich eds., Springer Verlag, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
13 Benkler, supra note 5, at 232. 
14 Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, The Architecture of Participation: Does Code 
Architecture Mitigate Free Riding in the Open Source Development Model?, 56 MGMT. SCI. 
1116, 1119-21 (2006); Bourdreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 7-8. 
15 Karim Lakhani, Hila Lifshitz-Assaf & Michael Tushman, Open Innovation and 
Organizational Boundaries; Task Decomposition, Knowledge Distribution and the Locus of 
Innovation, HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: INTEGRATION ECONOMIC AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 355, 357 (Anna Grandori ed, Edward Elgar Publishing 2013).   
16 Lakhani et. al., supra note 15, at 357. 
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transposing it into actual physical three-dimensional objects, practical 
as well as conceptual complications arise, as will be discussed in 
further detail below. 
Open Hardware is in many ways the hardware equivalent of 
“open software”. It is based on the same creative mechanism as OSS 
and is predicated on the same motivations and ideology to generate an 
open and accessible flow of knowledge. The difference lies in the 
“product”. Unlike OSS, where the product is the source code, the 
OSH product is a physical artifact, electrical, mechanical or 
otherwise, as well as the knowledge embodied into it.17 This fact has 
implications with respect to the structure of the open license 
agreement, and with respect to contributors’ ability to finalize the 
inventive process by manufacturing and commercializing its output. 
The OSH movement began with electronics hardware and 
initially gained popularity mostly within the amateur community. For 
reasons of cost and availability of equipment, initially many of its 
products were one-time hand-manufactured “hacks”. The movement 
has now progressed beyond pure amateur use.18 However, the number 
of OSH projects placed on Github and Thingiverse is steadily 
increasing. A data acquisition campaign for the period 2016-2017 
conducted by Bonvoisin and others shows OSH production of 
machine tools, vehicles, robotics, agriculture, medical prosthetics, 
diagnostic equipment, musical equipment, power supply, lab 
equipment, toys and games.19 Open hardware inventors have formed 
an umbrella association, the Open Source Hardware Association 
(OSHWA)20, which represents the “voice” of the open hardware 
community, tasked with advocating, educating and uniting 
stewardship of the open source hardware movement.21 
Still, the scale of OSH projects remains relatively modest 
compared to OSS. Several reasons may account for this. First, is the 
lack of sophistication of available technology. Many OSH projects 
are implemented in the electronics field, often by manually 
assembling existing components. The scalability of this technique is 
limited. However, OSH has seen a considerable boost through the 
advent of the technology of additive manufacturing or 3D printing.22 
                                                          
17 John R. Ackermann, Toward Open Source Hardware, 34 U. Dayton L. Rev. 183, 216 (2009). 
18 ALICIA GIBB, BUILDING OPEN SOURCE HARDWARE (Addison Wesley ed., 2015. 
19 J. Bonvoisin et al., What is the “Source” of Open Source Hardware? J. OPEN HARDWARE., 
2017, at 1, 5-6; http://doi.org/10.5334/joh.7 
20 OPEN SOURCE HARDWARE ASSOCIATION, https://www.oshwa.org/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2018). 
21 Gibb, supra note 18, at xii. 
22 Stefan Bechtold, 3D printing and the intellectual property system, Research Working Paper No. 28, in 
ECON. & STAT. SERIES (World Intellectual Property Organization 2015), 
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This technology is still evolving. In the future, 3D printing is 
expected to bring cost efficiencies, initially in the form of easy and 
rapid prototyping, and in the longer perspective, by becoming a 
principal, large-scale fabrication mode.23 Second, developing and 
manufacturing three-dimensional objects is capital-intensive and the 
path towards funding is not quite clear.  Given an environment which 
does not allow for appropriation of knowledge, on the one hand, and 
the inchoate state of the technology, on the other, models for 
capturing the economic value of OSH inventions remain to be 
developed. The tangible nature of OSH output is likely to complicate 
matters, as will be explained in detail below. Clearer business models 
will attract the interest of potential funding sources and scholarly 
literature can contribute in this regard. 
We will now turn to the mechanism that drives open community 
innovation, which underlies both OSS and OSH. Much of the 
scholarship in this regard derives from the OSS space and will 
constitute the primary source of the following discussion.   
II. THE OPEN KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION METHOD – IS OPEN 
COMMUNITY INNOVATION “FASTER, BETTER, 
CHEAPER”? 
Many have puzzled over the growth and sustainability of OSS. 
Economic theory is clear that when knowledge is freely shared within 
a community and not appropriated, it reduces an inventor’s ability to 
contract and, as a consequence, its ability to secure a proper reward 
for the inventive work. This in turn depresses the incentive to 
invent.24 
Development of OSS places this premise in question. The Linux 
environment, possibly the most successful OSS product, currently 
runs on more than 82% of the world’s smart phones and 92% of the 
world’s supercomputers, while Apache, an open source web-server 
framework, supports about 67% of the web-servers in the world.25  
                                                                                                                            
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_econstat_wp_28.pdf. 
23 Eli Greenbaum, Three-Dimensional Printing and Open Source Hardware, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. 
PROP. & ENT. L. 257, 259, (2013). 
24 Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 7-8; Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1751, 1755 (2010); Amy Kapczynski, Order without Intellectual 
Property Law: Open Science in Influenza, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539, 1796 (2017) 
25 Joshua M. Pearce, Emerging Business Models for Open Source Hardware, J. OPEN 
HARDWARE 1, 1 (2017) https://openhardware.metajnl.com/articles/10.5334/joh.4/; See also 
Beldiman & Flüchter, supra note 12, at 155-63; ZHUOXUAN LI, ET AL., WHY OPEN SOURCE, 
EXPLORING THE MOTIVATIONS OF USING AN OPEN MODEL FOR HARDWARE, CONFERENCE 
PAPER DETC 1, 2 (2017), www.researchgate.net/publication/316884384. 
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Blockchain, one of the most promising new developments, runs on 
OSS software.26 In large companies, open source software has 
become the de facto default standard when it comes to software 
selection decisions. The open model of knowledge production has 
come to increasingly supplement and even displace incumbent closed 
ones.27 OSS has come to play a more significant role “than was 
theoretically admissible by economic models of motivation and 
organization prevailing at the turn of the millennium. 
A unique dynamic underlies open source knowledge production: 
contributors participate in problem-solving communities, motivated 
by a range of pro-social and personal, but generally non-monetary 
considerations. 28 These motivations socialize community members to 
engage in collaborative, rather than competitive interaction and to 
share knowledge, rather than to appropriate it.29 The ethos of 
collaboration, in turn, spawns a pattern of communication among 
contributors that consists of frequent, freely shared updates, 
comments and feedback. A rapid cycle of innovative activity - 
finding, testing, and adopting or discarding solutions - is thus 
stimulated, in which contributors consume and reuse information on 
an ongoing basis. This process gives rise to considerable speed in 
finding solutions and to a great diversity of approaches. 30 
This dynamic seems attributable, primarily to two ingredients: 
one is the knowledge production mechanism, characterized by early 
disclosure of upstream information and second, the contributors’ 
motivation.31  Each will be discussed individually below. 
A. Production of Knowledge 
1. The anatomy of open inventive activity 
Open inventive activity can be conceptualized as a series of 
problems which are solved by making a large number of interacting 
decisions. Any given set of parameters of a project will be satisfied by 
multiple solutions. The initial task is to identify which approach best 
                                                          
26 HYPERLEDGER – OPEN SOURCE BLOCKCHAIN FOR BUSINESSES – IBM BLOCKCHAIN, 
www.ibm.com/blockchain/hyperledger.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).   
27 Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 6; Eric von Hippel, Susumu Ogawa and Jeroen P.J. de 
Jong, The Age of the Consumer-Innovator, MIT SLOANE MAG. 27, 29-30 Fall 2011.  
28 Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 7, at 11-12. 
29 Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 8. 
30 This dynamic is further associated with the absence of a hierarchical structure and full 
autonomy of the contributors. 
31 Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 7. 
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meets the parameters given, in terms of functionality, size, and cost.32 
For instance, if the goal is to construct a sustainable building by 
capturing a certain quantity of rainwater, the question arises whether 
rainwater will best be captured through roof structures, window 
structures or otherwise. Once the approach has been found, say a roof 
structure has been decided upon, a researcher will look for optimal 
solutions within that given approach.33 For instance, it will have to be 
decided whether a concave or a convex rooftop would be preferable.  
Any given decision in this process is made in an environment of 
uncertainty. To gain certainty, the decision is preceded by a series of 
trial and error experiments, which provides the researcher with better 
insight. Initially, these experiments are based on the inventor’s own 
stock of knowledge. Subsequently, they are influenced by a 
combination of outside factors, heuristics, theoretical understandings, 
analogies, as well as activities and experiments of others. This 
process is informed by a steady stream of communications between 
the researcher and the community in the form of mutual intermediate 
disclosures: updates by the researcher and observation and feedback 
by others.34   
2.  Disclosure 
It has been posited that when comparing two systems, the 
collaborative knowledge production model, based on multiple early 
disclosures, and the conventional single-inventor, “competing with 
others” model, the former presents advantages over the latter, in that 
it leads to earlier and more diffused reuse.35  
In a comprehensive experiment, Boudreau and Lakhani 
compared the two systems focusing on the interplay between 
disclosures and reuse of the knowledge disclosed.36 The first system, 
referred to as “intermediate disclosure”, involves disclosures which 
occur continuously, as progress is made during the problem-solving 
process. Knowledge generated upstream is made available for reuse 
to third parties on an ongoing basis. Its form is not standardized; it 
may come in varying shapes and quanta of knowledge, including 
partial and negative results, methods, data, progress etc. This system 
is commonly practiced within creative collaborative communities. A 
second system is a conventional single-inventor system, it is roughly 
                                                          
32 Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 9. 
33 Id. at 9. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.  at 17. 
36 Id. at 4. 
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analogous to inventive activity that might result in a patent grant. 
Labeled as a “final” disclosure system, its invention is revealed only 
once the inventive process is completed. It is presented in a 
standardized format, as an integral and wholly resolved solution. 
Reuse of the knowledge underlying the invention only occurs after 
the invention is complete.37 
3.  Intermediate vs. final disclosure 
These experiments showed that, when compared to a system 
based on final disclosure, a system of intermediate disclosure yields 
more frequent and wider ranging unrestricted disclosures.38 This fact 
increases the immediacy and extent of knowledge transfers and 
promotes more efficient reuse of the knowledge generated. A steady 
stream of updates allows problem solvers to observe and respond 
systematically to their own experimentation outcomes and to those of 
others. This tends to result in differentiated search paths and a greater 
diversity in approaches to solutions. Once the right approach is found, 
contributors can converge in a coordinated fashion on the optimal 
solution, demanding overall less effort and fewer costs, while yielding 
higher performance 
These findings reinforce and validate the openness practices of 
OSS communities. An open community setting is premised on early 
and repeated disclosures to many participants. It therefore leads to 
widespread diffusion of knowledge. The intermediate disclosure 
system accommodates a greater range and varying quanta of 
knowledge. For instance, disclosures contain partial and negative 
results, methods, data, progress etc.39 This fact promotes (1) a greater 
diversity in the search paths of individual contributors and (2) greater 
accuracy in the solution ultimately found, because downstream 
researchers have access to the entire history (methods, results, etc) 
and the opportunity to revise and correct. 
B. Motivation 
Motivation of peer-to-peer community contribution has 
generated a vast amount of literature.40 Sociologists now generally 
                                                          
37 Id. at 4-5. 
38 Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 7, at 14. 
39 Id. at 5. 
40 Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 7, at 7; Z. Li, supra note 25, at 4; Margit Osterloh und Bruno S. 
Frey, Managing Motivation: Warum das Thema heute noch brennender ist, Management 
Wissen, Markus Sulzberger, Robert J. Zaugg (eds), Springer, 43-49 (2018); Lerner & Jean 
Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197, 206 (2002) 
www.jstor.org/stable/3569837. 
34 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 35 
accept that rational self-interest does not explain a contributor’s 
willingness to spend numerous hours trying to tackle a community 
project, with no prospect of monetary gain.41 A wide range of social 
motivations, beyond material self-interest alone, 42 play a central role 
in human behavior.43  
Based on these recognitions, community contributors are viewed 
as being motivated by a heterogeneous blend of intrinsic and extrinsic 
non-monetary motivations.44 Extrinsic motivation involves doing an 
activity for some separable consequence and results from feelings 
such as ego boosts or receiving recognition. It has an important 
signaling effect; for instance, the open source participation 
designation of “committer” is a sought-after title in the larger 
community.45 Extrinsic motivation is usually externally driven and 
involves an audience and scales with the size of the audience.46 
Intrinsic motivation, on the other hand, does not contemplate an 
audience.47 It is based on individuals’ inherent satisfaction of carrying 
out an activity, their enjoyment or their sense of obligation or 
community.  Some of the dimensions of intrinsic motivation are the 
desire to be part of a team, the ability to express creativity, 
experiencing satisfaction and accomplishment, altruism, identification 
with a particular group, creative discovery, own use, learning-by-
doing, a challenge to be overcome and a difficulty resolved.48 Both 
types of motivation come into play in open communities. 
This motivational structure causes the inventive community to 
be socialized to collaborative rather than competitive interactions in 
the course of the innovation process, which, in turn, translate into 
early and liberal disclosures of knowledge. 
 
                                                          
41 See generally Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scrotchmer, Open Source Software: The New 
Intellectual Property Paradigm NBER Working Paper No. 12148, 12 (2006); Li, supra note 25, 
at 4; Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 7, at 5-6. 
42 Maurer & Scrotchmer, supra note 41, at 12. 
43 Benkler, supra note 5, at 3. 
44 Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 7, at 14; K. Boudreau, N. Lacetera & K. Lakhani "Incentives and 
Problem Uncertainty in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis." 57 MGMT. SCI. 843, 861 
(2011).  
45 Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 7, at 12; Z. Li, supra note 25, at 4; Boudreau et. al., supra note 
44, at 11. 
46 Z. Li, supra note 25, at 4; Lerner & Tirole, supra note 40, at 213-14. 
47 Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 7, at 4; Z. Li, supra note 25, at 4; Boudreau et. al, supra note 44, 
at 861. 
48 Z. Li, supra note 25, at 4; Margit Osterloh, Open Source Softwareproduktion: Ein neues 
Innovationsmodell? (2004), http://www.opensourcejahrbuch.de/download/jb2004/chapter_02/II-
4-OserlohRotaKuster.pdf; Maurer & Scrotchmer, supra note 41, at 11-12. 
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C. OSS today- a model for OSH? 
Given its primarily non-economic motivational structure, 
sustainability and scalability of the open source model have been 
questioned. Some scholars have viewed the early GNU license and 
movement to free source code, as an outburst of idealism, facilitated 
largely by the emergence of digitally enabled interactive new ways of 
communicating and collaborating.49 It has been suggested that open 
source (“OS”) production is more appropriate for niche applications 
and may be unable to scale sufficiently to sustain economically viable 
production.50 
On the other hand, following its emergence in the 1980s,51 OS 
rapidly gained popularity within the software community. Industry 
and scholarly literature perceived it as a new model of innovation.52  
As pointed out above, Linux currently runs on more than 82% of the 
world’s smart phones and the vast majority of the world’s 
supercomputers.  
Today’s OS is probably best characterized as multifaceted. 
Diverse models have emerged, which differ in terms of whether 
contributors are paid, whether the project is run hierarchically and 
how it is strategically managed.53 The most commonly encountered 
ones, are pure peer community production, evidenced by GNU, CC, 
Arch Linux and supported by volunteer-developers54, 
heterogeneously driven projects, such as Apache and Eclipse, which 
use mostly paid developers, Linux and Firefox, using some unpaid 
developers centered around a project, as well as the ones driven and 
                                                          
49 Stephen M. Maurer, Stepping Stones: Extending the Open Source Idea to Synthetic Biology, 
SYNBIO AND HUMAN HEALTH, Springer, Dordrecht, (2013), https://doi-
org.libproxy.scu.edu/10.1007/978-94-017-9196-0_14.  
50 See id.; Jan-Felix Schrape, Understanding Open-source Software Communities, CO-
CREATION - RESHAPING BUSINESS AND SOCIETY IN THE ERA OF BOTTOM-UP ECONOMICS 72, 78 
(M. Moritz & T. Redlich eds., Springer Verlag, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
author) (However, is assertion is placed into question by the parallel development of open 
movement in other areas, such as open science, open academic publishing, creative commons).  
51 The OS movement was born as a reaction to a technology shift, following which companies 
began treating as proprietary, source code, which had until then been freely accessible. In 
th1983, Richard Stallman, the founder of OS and the  “freeing software” philosophy, developed 
the GNU open software license, with the aim to contractually ensure propagation of free 
software and to prevent intellectual property from becoming an instrument of control by owners 
against users. Richard Stallman, GNU INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT, 
https://www.gnu.org/gnu/initial-announcement.html; Brian W. Carver, Share and Share Alike: 
Understanding and Enforcing Open Source and Free Software Licenses, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. 
J. 443, 446 (2005). 
52 Maurer & Scrotchmer, supra note 41, at 3. 
53 Schrape, supra note 50, at 75-7.   
54 Pearce, supra note 25, at 1. 
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paid for by large corporations, such as Android,55 where contributors 
are paid and make their contributions during work hours.56   
In some of the commercial settings, the social motivation seems 
to have somewhat eroded, because it can easily be replaced by 
monetary incentive.57 It is unclear whether in commercially-based 
models, the fundamental clash of values between contributors and 
commercial promoter in terms of hierarchy, autonomy, appropriation 
of knowledge etc., has been resolved and if so, how. 
At the same time, there is little dispute that OSS knowledge 
production has brought about a change of paradigm, from which 
many lessons can be learned.58 OSS has taught that innovation is 
primarily an emergent property of knowledge flow, brought about by 
early disclosure, sharing of intellectual resources and collective 
learning.59 It has taught that decomposition of tasks into small 
modules attracts highly qualified contributors,60 and that, in this 
manner, a project can be staffed by “the best person to produce a 
specific module of a project” within a specific time frame.61  It has 
further taught greater flexibility in the collaboration between all types 
of market actors62 and has opened the door to moving away from 
rigid organizational structures63 to create breeding grounds for further 
innovation in products and infrastructure”. 64   
These features will likely be incorporated in OSH, as OSS and 
OSH share a knowledge production mechanism. It is further 
reasonable to expect a similar variety of business models will emerge 
within OSH. We will now turn to the OS license, the legal construct 
                                                          
55 Schrape, supra note 50, at 75.; See also Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 4-19 (As a 
result of this convergence, many fail to differentiate between OS, as promoted initially by 
Richard Stallman and open innovation, a proprietary collaborative creation mechanism, 
advocated by Henry Chesbrough.) 
56 Lakani & Wolf, supra note 5, at 9-10 (have found that 40% of contributors to OSS are paid to 
participate. Lakhani communities and that 55% of the contributors make their contributions 
during work hours and receive a salary.) 
57 Maurer, supra note 49, at 13-14; Schrape, supra note 50, at 76. 
58 Carliss Baldwin & Eric von Hippel, Modeling a Paradigm Shift: From Producer Innovation 
to User and Open Collaborative Innovation, 22 No.6 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, 1369, 1413-14 
(2011), https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1100.0618; Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux 
and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L. J. 369, 371-72 (2002). 
59 Lemley & Shafir, supra note 6, at 141-42.  
60 Benkler, supra note 5, at 237; Benkler, supra note 58, at 14. 
61 Maurer & Scrotchmer, supra note 40, at 23. 
62 Schrape, supra note 50, at 78. 
63 Benker, supra note 5, at 45. 
64 Recent studies have indicated that with increasing scale and market relevance of an OS 
project, tends to depart from non-hierarchical, non-structured volunteer work, to a more 
commercially run structure in which contributors are paid and subject to hierarchical decision-
making. Schrape, supra note 50, at 74.   
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that enables the existence of OS as a knowledge production 
mechanism in the first place. 
III. THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE OF OPEN SOURCE 
A. The legal basis of the open license 
The open license agreement is a privately ordered, contractual 
instrument with a dual role. On the one hand, it governs the 
community and ensures its cohesion and collaborative, non-
competing spirit.65 On the other, it allocates IP rights and permissions 
relating to the knowledge generated among contracting parties, i.e. to 
the members of the community.  
The OS license is based on the premise that anyone should be 
able to “see the source … study it, modify it, and share it” and that 
modifications are to be disclosed under the terms of the original 
license.66 Its terms are meant to ensure compliance with the ethos of 
openness and accessibility by downstream users, so that no portion of 
a program can be appropriated.67 It ensures the free flow of 
knowledge among the potentially large number of recipients which 
constitutes a project’s creative community.  
The flow of knowledge within the community is regulated by a 
set of permissions and prohibitions surrounding the IP rights owned 
by the contributors, based on the following mechanism: copyright 
rights arise automatically upon creation, once a work is fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression.68 No action is required for these 
rights to attach. Because copyright is deemed to subsist in any 
computer program,69 software developers automatically own 
copyright rights in any program they create.  Copyright owners thus 
have the right to exclude others from copyright protected acts, 
including reproduction, modification and distribution.70 This right to 
exclude may be contracted away, for instance, by permitting to third 
parties to access the code, in exchange for the promise that the third 
party will reciprocate.   
Combined, these permissions granted by each developer, form a 
system of mutual cross-licenses, in which developer-contributors 
agree to license all their rights in the source code of their product to 
                                                          
65 Greenbaum, supra note 23, at 259. 
66 The Four Essential Freedoms of Free Software, GNU, https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-
sw.html#f1 (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
67 Ackermann, supra note 17, at 195.  
68 17 U.S.C. §101 (2010). 
6917 U.S.C. §101 (2010). 
70 17 U.S.C. §106 (2010). 
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any other compliant member of the community (licensee). This makes 
each licensee the recipient of the other parties’ (licensors’) license 
grant, and obligates it, in turn, to grant the same rights to others. Two 
principal obligations are involved: contributors are required to license 
under the terms governing the original license (1) the source code it 
develops and (2) the source code to any modifications to existing 
code.  
This structure ensures that both code and modifications are 
disclosed and passed on to successive downstream licensees. These 
licensees are entitled to use, extract, reuse, modify and distribute the 
licensed program to third parties. The owner/licensor also agrees, 
explicitly or implicitly, not to enforce its rights, as long as the 
licensee complies with the license terms.  In this way, the values of 
keeping the software free, both in the monetary and the accessibility 
sense, as well as unrestricted sharing, non-appropriability, attribution, 
etc. are hard-wired into the agreement. Looping back to the earlier 
discussion,71 the open license in effect implements the ingredients of 
the intermediate disclosure policy outlined by Boudreau and Lakhani: 
ongoing early disclosures that lead to widespread reuse.72 
The original open source license limits use of open source code  
to non-commercial entities, in what is, referred to as a “copyleft” (or 
share-alike) feature.73 Contributors are required to license any 
modifications under the terms of the original license, with the effect 
that all code subject to a copyleft license, which calls for non-
commercial use, must remain non-commercial throughout its 
downstream use.  Because the copyleft license was perceived as too 
restrictive for certain uses, “permissive” licenses emerged, which 
allow for downstream commercial use of the licensed material.74 
In addition to regulating the flow of knowledge in the spirit of 
openness, open licenses have collateral benefits in that, by their very 
structure, they increase of participants and diffuse technology. The 
fact that OSS communities use variants of a pre-existing standardized 
license terms additionally increases the efficiency of knowledge 
diffusion. The license offers a convenient and reliable way of 
transferring knowledge downstream. It will be used by many 
downstream contributors, because they are familiar with its terms. 
                                                          
71 See above discussion early disclosure. 
72 Boudreau & Lakhani, supra note 5, at 14. 
73 GNU OPERATING SYSTEM, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/licenses.html (last visited Nov. 3, 
2018). 
74 See e.g. BSD LICENSE, https://opensource.org/licenses/BSD-2-Clause (last visited Nov. 3, 
2018); APACHE LICENSE, https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 (last visited Nov. 3, 
2018) 
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This leads to participation of individuals who cannot be identified in 
advance. The non-proprietary structure of the knowledge flow gives 
rise to a non-competitive environment, in which developers feel free 
to share code and an early stage, without fear of appropriation by a 
third party.75  
B. Enforceability of open licenses 
For many years following the adoption of the open source 
license, its enforceability was in doubt. Questions were raised, among 
other things, as to lack of consideration and whether OS licenses are 
enforceable under contract or under IP law.  The dearth of early court 
decisions on this issue is attributable, in part, to the nature of 
enforceable rights enforced. OS licenses involve terms that keep IP 
rights diffused, rather than exclusionary and therefore, in most such 
instances, no substantial economic value is at stake.76 Nonetheless, 
because open license terms constitute the glue that holds together 
countless software transactions and binds millions of OSS 
contributors, judicial validation of this license structure is important.  
In Jacobson v. Katzer,77 the Federal Circuit removed some of the 
doubts surrounding OS license enforceability. The court confirmed 
that IP rights granted as part of an artistic open license are assertible, 
in holding that the defendant’s unauthorized copying of certain 
textual files, owned by the plaintiff, violated a license condition, 
rather than a covenant.78 The legal effect of violating a condition, as 
opposed to a covenant, is to render the license ineffective, thus 
leaving the unlicensed use of copyrighted material open to an 
infringement action.79 An OS license can therefore form an 
enforceable contractual relationship. This fact was more recently 
confirmed in Artifex Software v. Hancom, where a California District 
Court refused to dismiss a plaintiff’s contract claim in connection 
                                                          
75 Maurer & Scrotchmer, supra note 41, at 14; Ackermann, supra, note 17, at 195.  
76 OSS licenses are seldom asserted in courts. One reason for this is that enforcement would be 
in the direction of “openness”, i.e. it would enforce terms meant to keep knowledge and IP 
rights diffused among the members of the community, rather than concentrated in one or a small 
number of owners, as a conventional IP license would. Therefore, in most instances, no 
substantial economic value is at stake in open licenses and there is little incentive to sue 
(although this must be qualified in light of statutory copyright damages which may be imposed 
regardless of the amount in dispute. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)). 
77 Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
78 Id. 
79  The scope of this holding remains in dispute. Some believe its significance may be limited 
contract construction, which would vary from state to state. Hersh R. Reddy, Jacobsen v. 
Katzer: The Federal Circuit Weighs in on the Enforceability of Free and Open Source Software 
Licenses, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 299, 310 (2009).  
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with a GNU license.80 Similar decisions have been issued in other 
jurisdictions.81  
Certain tension points are expected to continue causing disputes 
in OSS licenses. These include the failure to attribute, as well as 
unauthorized incorporation in proprietary products of the material 
licensed under a copyleft license, such as GPL. A possible outcome 
would be that such acts constitute a breach of the license agreement 
and would entitle the creator to bring a claim for copyright 
infringement. Breach of a contractual clause might void the effect of 
the license, resulting in a finding of infringement against the 
breaching party. Remedies could consist of damages or an injunction, 
requiring the infringer to cease use of the licensed material.  
The discussion, so far, has concentrated on general principles of 
open licenses, illustrated primarily by OSS licenses. We will now 
focus on the specifics of OSH licenses and how they differ from OSS 
licenses.  
C. The Open Hardware license 
OSH licenses have been adapted from the OSS license to fit the 
needs of hardware design. They are built on the same structural and 
ideological principles and have largely the same features as OSS 
licenses.  Some of the better-known licenses are the TAPR Open 
Hardware License82 and the CERN Open Hardware license.83  
The fundamental difference, compared to OSS, is the relation to 
copyright. The OSS license works well, because copyright arises 
automatically upon creation. It constitutes a license obligation trigger 
or “hook” with respect to any copyrightable materials created within 
the community. Source code, the product of OSS innovation, is 
presumptively copyrightable and gives its the owner the power to 
contract.  
This mechanism does not necessarily work for the OSH license. 
The output of the OSH process consists of (1) documentation, 
instructing the user how to build the hardware product and (2) the 
hardware product itself.  The documentation follows the principles of 
the OSS license, because most of its components, such as text, 
                                                          
80 Artifex Software, Inc. v. Hancom, Inc., No. 16-cv-06982-JSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62815, 
at *18 (N.D. Cal. April 25, 2017 and September 12, 2017) (The matter was settled out of court 
in December 2017.) 
81 E.g. Welte v. Sitecom Deutschland GmbH, case nr. 21 O 6123/04, Munich District Court 
(May 19, 2005). 
82 THE TAPR OPEN HARDWARE LICENSE, www.tapr.org/ohl.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
83 CERN OHL VERSION 1.2, www.ohwr.org/documents/294 (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
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drawings and code, are presumptively copyrightable. They can 
operate as a license hook much in the same manner as source code 
does and trigger copyright enforcement. However, when it comes to 
the physical hardware product, there are serious doubts as to whether 
it can be subject to copyright, and therefore as to its reliability as a 
trigger.   
For this reason, the OSH license grants rights to the two outputs 
of the innovative process (1) the Documentation and (2) the Product, 
the physical hardware output created based on the Documentation.84  
The following will give an overview over each of these provisions in 
turn.  
1. Rights in the “Documentation” as trigger of license 
obligations 
The primary trigger of license obligations under the OSH license 
is the Documentation. It contains all the information necessary to 
construct the physical output and may include schematic diagrams, 
designs, circuit or circuit board layouts, mechanical drawings, flow 
charts and descriptive text, and other explanatory material.85  
a. Copyright 
These items may fall into protected categories of “works” under 
copyright laws. It can be assumed that text and code are protectable as 
“literary works” in the US, as well as in most members of the Berne 
Convention;86 schematics of circuits, engineering and technical 
drawings, as well as CAD and STS files may qualify for copyright 
protection; in the US as “pictorial, graphic and sculptural” works;87 a 
video would be protected as audio-visual work.88 The various 
components of the Documentation would be entitled to protection, as 
long as they display a modicum of creativity.89 Once these 
requirements are met, they are presumptively sufficient to trigger 
copyright rights to the documentation for purposes of the OSH 
license.90 A contributor/licensor would thus acquire exclusive rights 
                                                          
84 Ackermann, supra note 17, at 192. 
85 CERN OPEN HARDWARE LICENSE, https://www.ohwr.org/projects/cernohl/documents (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
86 Oracle America v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
87 Bechtold, supra note 22, at 14. 
88 It should be noted that these are assumptions as to protectability, which have not been tested 
in court 
89 Feist Publications v Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 341 (1991).  
90 Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., No. MJG-06-2662, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112846 
(D. Md. Sept. 30, 2011). 
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of reproduction, modification and distribution of the Documentation, 
which can be contracted. 
A wrinkle appears when the Documentation is used to make the 
hardware product, but the user does not actually engage in one of the 
acts prohibited by copyright law. For instance, if a user were to 
merely “use” the documentation to construct a product, but not 
engage in an act prohibited by copyright, such as reproduction, 
modification or distribution, copyright law would not be infringed.91 
A user who makes the product based on reading the documentation, 
would therefore escape liability because (a) no act infringing 
copyright in the documentation can be shown, and (b) there generally 
is no copyright in a three dimensional utilitarian product. This 
constitutes a gap in the OSH license’s enforceability (unless the 
contributor had separately secured patent protection). 
While the manufacture of a physical object by traditional means 
probably does not infringe copyright, it has been suggested that 
manufacture by way of a 3D printing process does.92 The argument is 
based on the use of CAD and STL design files during the 3D printing 
process.  To 3D print a design file, a user would have to copy the files 
into the memory of the 3D printer. Throughout the printing process 
these files are transformed into a series of print-ready two-
dimensional slices. A user thus engages in two acts prohibited by 
copyright, reproduction and modification (making a derivative work). 
This would trigger the copyright protection required for the license to 
be enforceable.93 
b. Patent 
Some portion of the Documentation, such as circuits or circuit 
board layouts may be patentable, if they fulfill the requirements of 
being new, useful and non-obvious94 and do not consist of merely 
abstract ideas.95 Patents are not common in the open hardware 
environment, possibly because procuring patent protection is 
relatively time consuming and costly, but also because appropriating 
knowledge in the form of exclusive IP rights is contrary to the ethos 
of open hardware.96 Still, in some cases, patents may be the only 
                                                          
91 Gusler v. Fischer, 580 F. Supp. 2d 309, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
92 Greenbaum, supra note 23, at 275-76. 
93 Id. at 276-77. 
94 35 USC §§101, 103. 
95 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank. Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). 
96 Jason Schultz & Jennifer Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive Patent License 
as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 26 Harv. 
J. L. & Tech. 1, 10 et. seq. (2012). 
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contractable IP right by which the OSH can trigger license obligations 
with respect to a particular product. Unlike copyright, patent rights do 
not arise upon creation, and consequently, cannot automatically 
trigger license obligations. Nonetheless, if procured, they can serve as 
trigger and, to this end, some of the OSH licenses have been modified 
to accommodate patent rights.97 Once obtained, the patent rights are 
licensed under the open license and subject to the same license 
obligations as exclusive rights under copyright law. The patent owner 
grants to all community members the right to practice the invention, 
or, alternatively, a personal immunity from suit relating to the 
patent(s).98  Furthermore, licensees must license any improvements 
under the terms of the original license.99 In other words, the OSH 
licensed patent does not primarily play an exclusionary role, but 
rather an inclusive one, by creating a permissive zone around the 
documentation and the physical product, in which users are free from 
infringement liability to the patentee, but not from infringement 
claims brought by third parties.   
Under certain circumstances, however, the documentation may 
operate as a “defensive patent publication” and even insulate from 
infringement actions by third parties.100 This is because a sufficiently 
widespread publication of an invention may destroy its novelty and 
render the invention unpatentable to others, by placing it into the 
public domain.101 This eliminates the risk of possible future 
infringement actions. In some industries it is common practice to 
publish “defensively”, in order to maintain patent-free space.102 
An effective defensive publication must function as an 
“enabling” description, in other words, it must describe the invention 
in sufficient detail to allow others skilled in the respective art, to 
practice it and make the product. To be effective, a defensive 
publication must further include a description of the idea of the 
                                                          
97 TAPR Open Hardware License v1.0, TAPR (May 25 2007),  
www.tapr.org/TAPR_Open_Hardware_License_v1.0.txt; CERN Open Hardware License v.1.1, 






98 Ackerman, supra note 17, at 194.   
99 See, e.g., TAPR license, supra note 97, section 2.2.  
100 Beldiman & Flüchter, supra note 12, at 157-63. 
101 35 U.S.C. §102(b) (2011). 
102 DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS, www.defensivepublications.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
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invention, its function, the flow of data, as well as applicable 
drawings or figures.103  
OSH Documentation can operate much like a defensive 
publication: it is designed to record in detail every iteration, trial and 
error, partial solutions and final solution in the development of the 
product. Its purpose is to instruct downstream users on how to 
produce the invention, with sufficient specificity to allow a person 
skilled in the field to make the product. If published in a manner 
accessible by the public, OSH documentation may well meet the 
requirements of a defensive publication with respect to the product or 
project at issue. In this role, use of the Documentation achieves the 
open hardware’s goal by a different path: it diffuses knowledge, not 
by binding licensees to openness, but by placing the invention in the 
public domain.  
Finally, patent protection may serve its traditional exclusionary 
function and prevent non-licensees from practicing the invention. 
Even if a patent owner-licensor has issued non-exclusive licenses to 
several licensees, it would typically still be entitled to prevent an 
unauthorized user of the invention from practicing it. Depending on 
the circumstances, sufficient exclusionary value may be left in the 
patent in order to allow its owner to extract economic value from it. 
This avenue is, of course, foreclosed in the event the Documentation 
has been used as a defensive publication.  
2. Rights in the “Product” as trigger of license 
obligations 
The OSH license also grants rights to the “Product”. Product in 
this context is the physical output of the OSH innovation process, in 
the form of an electronic, a 3d printed or any other physical object, 
that is generated through the OSH process based on the 
Documentation.104 Products are best protected by patent. Copyright 
applies only qualifiedly. 
a. Copyright 
Copyright protection for physical three-dimensional objects is 
generally limited to products which are artistic in nature.  Utilitarian 
products are not copyright protectable for the following reasons.  
For purposes of copyright protection, three-dimensional works 
are evaluated under the standards of the “pictorial, graphic, 
                                                          
103 Beldiman & Flüchter, supra note 12, at 158. 
104 See supra Section 4.3.1.  
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sculptural” works doctrine.105 Under this doctrine, a “useful article”, 
i.e. an article with an intrinsic utilitarian function is not copyright 
protectable. In cases in which a product displays both utilitarian and 
artistic features, it must be determined whether the article’s aesthetic 
features can be identified and can exist separately from its utilitarian 
aspects.106 To that end, a court would look first, whether the artistic 
features can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art 
separate from the useful article, and second, whether, if it were 
imagined separately from the useful article into which it is 
incorporated, it would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural work—either on its own or fixed in some other tangible 
medium of expression.107  This standard is difficult to meet and most 
utilitarian products would probably fail. However, OSH developed 
artistic objects, such as sculptures manufactured by means of the 3D 
printing process, would stand a better chance of meeting the “useful 
article” test.108  
Absence of copyright protection for utilitarian OSH products 
means that an inventor cannot bind downstream licensees by a right 
that arises automatically. The OSH license may therefore not be 
enforceable when it comes to utilitarian Products, to the extent it 
relies solely on copyright. This fact does not necessarily have serious 
ramifications: as long as the OSH license also conveys rights in 
copyrightable, the can, as described in detail above, act as a license 
trigger. In the alternative, patent protection would ensure that the 
OSH license remains enforceable as far as the Product grant is 
concerned.  
b. Patent 
Patent law is the proper IP instrument to protect utilitarian OSH 
Products. How it applies to physical products, is largely the same as 
described under Documentation above. 109  
3. Know-How and latent knowledge 
Know-how is not expressly mentioned in the license agreement; 
however, it is omnipresent in the process of community innovation 
and deserves separate discussion. As used for present purposes, it is 
the combined, cumulative knowledge on how to develop and 
                                                          
105 17 U.S.C. §101. 
106 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017).  
107 Id. at 1011. 
108 17 U.S.C. §101; See generally Star Athelica, L.L.C., 137 S.Ct. at 1008-10. 
109 See supra section 4.3.1.b Patent.  
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manufacture a physical product, generated in the course of a given 
OSH invention, regardless of any IP rights which may apply.  
Most of this know-how refers to the invention process of trial 
and error, partial results, tentative solutions, final solutions, etc. and is 
captured by the Documentation. That part is available for immediate 
reuse by community members. Separately, in the context of 
community innovation, most often an additional type of know-how 
exists, which will be referred to as latent know-how. 110  Latent know-
how is not contained in the Documentation. This is so, because the 
Documentation primarily records the result of relatively linear 
thinking in pursuit of a solution to a given problem. Information that 
appears to be of lesser relevance to the immediate innovation 
outcome, such as general knowledge, alternative paths that have been 
discarded, collateral observations, etc. may not be reflected in the 
Documentation. Latent know-how is akin to “sticky” knowledge, 
described by Eric von Hippel,111 in that its transfer out of the 
community would be difficult or even impossible and come at a high 
cost. However, latent knowledge exists within the community and is 
low hanging fruit, easily accessible if the problem is posed slightly 
differently, say, in the course of improving the original solution.112  
As will be discussed below, whether or not it can be tapped into 
successfully is a function of the relationship between the inventive 
community and the implementer.113  
This concludes the discussion on the flow of knowledge 
associated with the OSH inventive process and its fixation into 
contractual obligations that govern the inventive community. Next, 
we will examine the ability to capture economic value in the context 
of an OSH invention, in which knowledge is widely diffused.  
IV. CAPTURING VALUE FROM CONSTRUCTING A TANGIBLE 
PRODUCT 
It is commonly accepted that control over its IP rights is required 
for capturing economic value from an invention. The ability to 
                                                          
110 Formalized knowledge is knowledge that is captured in the Documentation or other means in 
which it is easily transmissible to third parties. Latent knowledge is knowledge which has not 
been formally captured, but it is knowledge that was a part of the inventor’s mental process 
during the inventive process, e.g. trial and error, alternative search paths, discarded experiments, 
etc.  
111 Eric von Hippel, “Sticky Information” and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for 
Innovation, MGMT. SCI. 429, 429 (Apr. 1994) https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.4.429. 
112 This latent know-how may be suggested by or hinted at in the Documentation, but it may be 
a completely new approach triggered by the altered question. 
113 See infra section 5.4. 
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capture value operates to attract investment.114 Both OSS and OSH 
present a challenge in this regard, as knowledge is diffused and 
exclusively appropriable IP rights are unavailable. Compared to OSS, 
OSH however, faces higher hurdles, because greater financial 
resources are required to produce and commercialize physical 
products. 
A. Atoms vs. bits - the tangible nature of OSH 
The core difference between a OSS and a OSH product is that 
the OSS product is digital, i.e. consists of bits, while the OSH product 
is tangible and consists of atoms. 115 The processes required to ready 
software for final use are all digital, because software is self-
executing, in that the necessary instructions are incorporated in the 
program itself and carried out automatically. On the other hand, a 
tangible OSH product requires multiple operations such as testing, 
prototyping, marketing, permitting, manufacturing, storage, shipping 
and distribution before getting to the end-user. In addition, component 
parts and raw material must be purchased and physical manufacturing 
space must be secured.116 All these tasks involved are labor- and 
capital-intensive. How can an individual inventor or an OSH 
inventive community fund all these operations? 
B. Inventor commercialization 
The most approachable way to meet the financial obligations of 
production, and at the same time to preserve the open community 
ethos, is for an OSH inventor is to self-finance, rely on donations or 
grants, or find a business model which, at a minimum, covers costs. 
The simplest model is for the inventor to self-fund the manufacture 
and sale of product in the market. A leading example is Aleph 
Objects,117 which sells the OSS and OSH Lulzbot 3D printer, used to 
make scientific tools such as tube racks, centrifuges and microscope 
accessories.118 An alternative approach is to license the technology 
                                                          
114 Investment is generally based on the expectation of capturing economic value from the 
invention.  Economic value can best be captured with the right to control the invention in the 
form of IP constitutes the necessary “currency” to attract investment. 
115 Additional factors differentiate OSS from OSH, including (1) the tools available. Easily 
useable CAD tools are still being developed. For instance, on Github sharing and distributing 
the work and debugging is easier than for OSS than OSH.  (2) the self-executing feature of 
software gives rise to a sense of immediacy of the “reward” for contributor. GITHUB, 
https://github.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
116 Bonvoisin, supra note 19, at 3. 
117 ALEPH OBJECTS, www.alephobjects.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
118 Pearce, supra note 25, at 5. 
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under an open source license, while securing trademark protection for 
any products sold, entitling the inventor to royalties for third party 
sales. This model is being used successfully by the Arduino OSH 
ecosystem.119 In addition to its platform, which is made available on 
an open source basis, Arduino offers consulting services relating to its 
technologies. Funding can also be secured from non-profit 
organizations or through crowdsourcing. For instance, with the help 
of funding from a foundation, Open Source Ecology (OSE) is 
developing open source blueprints of a set of “the 50 most important 
machines that it takes for modern life to exist – everything from a 
tractor, to an oven, to a circuit maker.”120 The blueprints are 
published on an open platform and freely accessible to any interested 
user, OSE also runs paid-for workshops.121  
In the instances cited above, the IP rights are diffused in that the 
designs underlying the product are publicly available. The inventors’ 
strategy in these instances is to out-innovate possible competition, by 
relying on the ongoing stream of low cost research and development 
that flows from the innovative community. In conjunction with their 
communities, these inventors have developed a high degree of latent 
expertise and knowledge, which allows them to readily come up with 
solutions for improvements, further development and new 
applications.  Reliance on the same inventive community on an 
ongoing basis brings with it the competitive advantages of easily 
tapping into latent knowledge and of conveying a certain guarantee of 
quality of the product.122  These benefits are unavailable to outsiders, 
even though they may have access to the designs.123  
Absent relatively substantial investment, likely from a for-profit 
actor, the inventor commercialization model has limitations in that it 
is hard to scale. At this point, pure OSH companies operate mostly as 
niche providers.124  
 
                                                          
119 ARDUINO, www.arduino.cc (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
120OPEN SOURCE ECOLOGY, https://www.opensourceecology.org/ (last visited Nov. 3, 
2018). 
121OPEN SOURCE ECOLOGY, 
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123 Lars Zimmermann, The Open Source Hardware and Open Design Business Models Matrix, 
BUILDING OPEN SOURCE HARDWARE, (Alicia Gibb, ed., 2015). 
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C. IP prerequisites for commercially based exploitation 
The need to scale the operations surrounding an OSS/OSH 
product raises the question of securing investment, and, in turn, of the 
economic incentive to invest into an OSH invention. A commercially-
oriented firm would expect to receive a quantum of IP rights that give 
the firm exclusivity or at least a sufficient degree of control, to place 
it in favorable position in the market. Such rights would take the form 
of a license “package” that grant the licensee exclusive rights, or at 
least control over the relevant IP rights, for the maximum possible 
duration.  In addition, an investor-licensee would receive safeguards 
of enforceability, such a clear description of the contracting parties, a 
listing of the rights transferred, comprehensive definition of the 
product licensed and of the rights granted,  e.g. control of rights to 
manufacture, use, sell, replicate, etc. the physical product, including 
any software, know-how, drawings, documentation, as well as 
exclusivity in specified markets, as well as various warranties and 
indemnities, termination provisions, etc. 
This quantum and structure of rights is not available in a 
community innovation setting because the logic underlying 
community innovation value creation by early and frequent 
disclosures. By way of the rights anchored in the OSH license, OSH 
promotes diffusion, rather than concentration of knowledge and 
allows value to be captured by the community, rather by a single 
economic actor.125  This structure not only allows free use by the 
community but encourages third-party users of the technology to 
enter the market.126  
In short, a community invention setting does not generate 
appropriable IP rights which could place an investor in a favorable 
competitive position.127 Rational economic actors would therefore 
have little incentive to invest in the commercial exploitation of a pure 
open source invention.128 
D. Capturing value in the absence of IP rights 
Because, as described above, pure community inventions tend 
not to attract investment from commercially oriented firms, various 
hybrid models of exploitation have emerged. They range from pure 
                                                          
125 Henry Chesbrough & Melissa Appleyard, Open Innovation and Strategy, 50 CAL. MGMT. 
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peer community projects, driven by volunteers, to corporate-led 
projects and often are combinations of the two.129  These models 
bundle OSH inventions with IP-based ones:130 one may function as 
the primary profit center, while the other may serve as add-on or 
complementary products. 131 For instance, if a proprietary cell phone 
uses an open source application or operating system, the value of the 
proprietary phone would be enhanced by the free nature of the open 
technology. 132  In effect then, even though the community invention’s 
IP rights are diffused, the invention can add to the overall ability to 
make a profit.133   
Hybrid models combine two heterogeneous systems: one 
property-based, the other is community-based. These systems diverge 
in ethos and values. As will be explained below, tensions may arise 
from this. careful management of the boundary between systems is 
mandated.134 
E. Ongoing collaboration with the community as primary 
source of innovation – clash of values 
In a hybrid business model, that combines community 
innovation with commercial implementation, the source of innovation 
generally continues to be the community.  Activities such as testing, 
prototyping, manufacturing, but importantly, also product 
improvements and further development, typically draw on the 
community innovation, and require an ongoing exchange of 
information between implementer and community.135  
However, the values of the two groups are misaligned.136 A 
commercial firm seeks to appropriate formal IP rights in order to 
extract economic value from the invention. Open communities have 
typically opted out of formal IP and adhere to a regime of sharing and 
open disclosure of knowledge. This ideological misalignment may 
give rise to tension in different ways. 
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One source of tension is the difference in organizational 
structures. An open community usually consists of volunteers and 
functions in a non-hierarchical, non-structured manner. Community 
contributors act as autonomous, spontaneous problem-solvers, at a 
time and in a space determined by them. A hybrid model, on the other 
hand, tends to push for a commercially run structure, subject to 
hierarchical decision-making. It favors paid contributors.137 With 
increasing scale and market relevance of a project, the pressure to 
impose more orchestrated goals and specific deadlines and operate in 
a strictly commercial manner also increases.138  
Further tension flows from differing expectations regarding the 
transfer of knowledge. A commercial firm generally expects an 
invention to be handed over in a complete package, which contains 
substantially all the information required for productization, as would 
be the case with a patent. However, innovation is an iterative process, 
characterized by uncertainty, in an environment of successive trial 
and error experiments. In an open community setting, innovation is 
the result of ongoing communications among members of the 
community, queries, updates, receipt of observations and feedback, 
solutions found, discarded, modified, readopted and improved.139 The 
innovation is therefore contained in sequential, iterative and often 
messy disclosures. Furthermore, certain latent or “sticky” knowledge 
remains within the community. 140 Its transfer away from the 
community comes at the cost of maintaining a smooth collaborative 
relationship141 requires sensitive management of the community 
relationship. 
Finally, allocation of benefits of the creative output between 
community and implementer may be a source of discontent. If 
community members’ perceive that the commercial operator receives 
disparate profits, their motivation may be undermined.142  
In short, the ideological misalignment between the two systems 
risks destabilizing their collaboration.143 If community members drop 
out for lack of motivation or because they question the integrity and 
values of the community, its internal governance regime is threatened. 
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A real possibility exists that the community may collapse,144 as 
contributors have alternate ways of spending their time and talent. For 
the implementer, on the other hand, severing the interaction with the 
community would come at a high cost, in that it would deprive the 
commercial actor of its source of innovation.145  All of this, presents a 
strategic challenge for both groups. Mutual finesse is required in 
order not to alienate the other group.146 
CONCLUSION 
The success of collaborative, community open innovation has 
been evidenced primarily in the context of open source software 
(OSS), i.e. the realm of intangible, digital products (bits). This paper 
asks whether the success of OSS can be replicated in an environment 
involving three-dimensional tangible products (atoms), or open 
hardware (OSH). To this end, we have examined OSS and OSH from 
several perspectives.  
The first aspect considered was the open community innovation 
mechanism, common to both OSS and OSH. Both follow an 
intermediate disclosure system, which involves early and repeated 
disclosures of the knowledge that underlies the innovation. This fact 
leads to its wide diffusion and frequent downstream reuse giving rise 
to an overall enhanced innovation power. However, we also noted 
that widespread diffusion of the knowledge underlying the innovation 
is in tension with the appropriability of IP and the need for 
investment.  
The second aspect considered, was the structure of the open 
license. Certain differences exist between OSS and OSH licenses, 
necessitated by the tangible nature of the hardware product. The OSS 
license is based on the fact that copyright arises automatically upon 
creation. Every software developer thus owns a contractable IP right. 
Combined these rights underlie the OSS license. OSH products, 
which are tangible, are not necessarily subject to copyright law, a fact 
which raises a question as to the enforceability of the OSH structure. 
However, it is likely that this problem has been addressed by the fact 
that the OSH grants a license in the “Documentation”, most of whose 
components are likely subject to copyright. 
Third, we looked at what steps are necessary for each final 
product to reach its end-user. Software is self-executing, in that all 
instructions for implementation are incorporated into the product and 
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executed digitally. Consequently, its implementation entails relatively 
low costs.  Hardware, on the other hand, requires labor and cost-
intensive operations associated with manufacture, distribution, etc., 
which require investment. Commercial firms are generally motivated 
to invest by the availability of appropriable IP rights.  No such rights 
are available under the open source license because its effect is to 
diffuse, rather than concentrate rights for purposes of appropriation. 
This suggests that the tangible nature of a product makes it more 
difficult to realize the full social value of a community invention. 
Does this fact however negate the ability to implement open larger 
scale community projects in the hardware space altogether? In the 
OSS field certain hybrid business models have evolved, which make 
successful commercial exploitation at a larger scale possible. These 
models combine complementary IP-based products with community 
innovation. In this manner, the non-appropriability of the community 
innovation tends not to detract from the ability to monetize the 
combined product. A scalable hybrid model in the hardware context 
can therefore not be ruled out.  
Finally, the inventive community is the continuing source of 
innovation and value. This fact entails two aspects. A large quantum 
of latent or “sticky” knowledge resides in the community, which can 
be tapped by the implementer for purposes of improvements and 
further innovation. In order to take advantage of this resource, a 
sustainable relationship with the community is necessary. This 
relationship may be difficult given the clash of ideology between 
open community values and the goals of commercially-oriented 
implementers. Managerial finesse and people skills are required to 
manage this relationship. 
To sum up, this article concludes that the innovative power of 
OSS (bits) can be replicated in an environment involving three-
dimensional tangible products (atoms). Even though OSH products 
face considerably greater hurdles to overcome compared to OSS 
products, in a hybrid business community – commercial business 
model, economic value can be captured from OSH inventions.  
 
